Prof. Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo, Vice Dean in charge of Research and Cooperation, Faculty of Social and Management Sciences, University of Buea, talks on the often difficult relations between Sudan and newly independent South Sudan.
Why has it been difficult for Sudan and South Sudan to reach agreement on outstanding issues following South Sudan's independence in 2011?
Relations between Sudan (formerly the northern part of Sudan) and South Sudan have been marked by a historic misunderstanding which the latter's independence only partially solved. The dichotomy between the two on pseudo-religious and truncated racial classification (an Arab Muslim North, now Sudan versus a Christian/animist South, now South Sudan) poisoned relations between the two components of what used to be one British colony and country since independence, before South Sudan separated in 2011.
This led to a de facto form of segregation, discrimination and exclusion for Southerners when the nation seemed to be implicitly defined in Arabic terms or as an Arabic republic. This "Arabicisation" drift and the separatism that it generated explains the long-drawn conflict between North and South, but also the latter conflict in Darfur which pitted elements considered Arab (Janjaweed) and African (or non-Arab). The Arabicised elements (to be distinguished from Muslims as a religious group), although black in skin colour, claimed both racial difference and implied superiority, monopolising positions in government, education, etc. Such a framing of Sudan excluded the possibility of an ethnically plural nation with all identity groups being at the same level.
Although all groups were phenotypically identical, the Nilotic peoples (in the South) were treated as a people apart and in some way inferior through exclusion and sheer neglect. Although the South later came to produce the bulk of the country's wealth when petroleum was discovered, this benefited exclusively the North. The war undertaken by the Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA) was meant to redress this situation through complete independence. Its outcome was not only military, but largely related to the Bashir regime's constant alignment with the then Gaddafi regime that was classified as terrorist or was known to openly support terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.
On its own, the South would never have had independence through a military outcome. The international community, hostile to the Bashir regime, its radical political Islam and bent towards supporting terrorist groups (as it still does with the Janjaweed militia), decided to impose independence in the South and on its own terms as a means to weaken the regime. With the bulk of its wealth away, Sudan's strategic importance and sources of funding for its own sustenance and sponsorship of terrorism have been cut off. Oil resources that could have been an economic weapon in the hands of the Kartoum regime in its conflicts with the West are now accessible through a new state whose creation it somewhat sponsored.
It was thus only reluctantly and fully aware of these developments that the Bashir regime accepted independence for the South and has continued to pose obstacles for that independence to be effective through unresolved issues. Firstly, it has raised the question of the distribution of oil revenue because the oil itself is still mainly transported through Sudanese territory. This is used as a means of blackmail by constant threats to obstruct pipelines. Secondly, there is the question of the disputed territory of Abyei which it claims not on grounds of legitimacy, but that of race when it presents its nomadic herdsmen as Arabs who should belong to Sudan (as if the South cannot be multi-ethnic, multi-racial or multicultural). This is consistent with the racialism of Khartoum which is at the root of the Darfur 'genocide.'
Lastly, there are accusations of Sudan sponsoring armed opponents to the Juba government; although the South is also accused of doing a similar thing against the Khartoum government. To these issues can be added the lingering distrust borne out of the long-standing attitudes of the Khartoum regime towards Nilotic peoples. Independence has not definitely healed the wounds with a magic wand. The creation of South Sudan in the circumstances outlined above only complicated issues; though some of them could have been resolved through thorough negotiations.
Though leaders of both countries at a meeting on September 3, 2013 agreed to mend ties, can much be expected from this latest agreement, given that they have made such promises before?
All depends on whether the two states are willing to be realistic about what they have embarked on. For such initiatives to succeed, both parties must come to terms with the fact that as people sharing the same space (whether as one country or as neighbouring countries), they must have to collaborate constructively. They have to manage a common boundary and resources in common and live in peace. While Sudan must give up the crazy idea of defining its peoples as Arabs versus others which make its claims on Abyei sound like a Nazi attempt to bring all Germans into a single Germany, South Sudan should be ready to forgive abuses suffered in the past and act as statesmen who guarantee peaceful co-existence with neighbours.
Hostility toward a former war enemy that has become a neighbour in the international scene will not solve issues as the people are still linked by cultural, social and economic ties. Sudan must also come to terms with the fact that its former province is now an independent country. Moreover, it seems there has never been real reconciliation between the two countries. That needs to be. Years of disagreement and warfare cannot end without such a cathartic moment for negative memories to be cleaned and healed. That will lay the groundwork for better relations between the two countries, "frères-ennèmis," as it is said in French.
What role can the international community play in facilitating the return to normalcy between the former belligerents?
There are different levels of international actors (continental, great powers, United Nations) with each being capable of giving specific support to the process of finding lasting solutions to the problems. The unfortunate thing is that one of the protagonists, the Sudanese President, has been declared persona non grata by the great powers and even the United Nations. The fact that Omar el-Bashir is under international legal prosecution complicates issues as the international community establishment cannot sit at the same discussion table with him. Moreover, he is considered as part of the problem and others, rather than a potential provider of solutions.
As such, the international community will like to have him out of the way in The Hague, rather than at a negotiation table on relations with South Sudan. One should even foresee some strong action (even military) to oust him after the Syrian campaign that is underway. Recent history in the North Africa-Middle East area points to a general scheme to unseat regimes of the Bashir type. His turn may be coming especially as it has been the object of some strategic actions in the past (strikes against suspected chemical weapons plants, accusations of supporting terrorism, creation of South Sudan).
If such plans are underway, then what I see the great powers doing is continuing their stranglehold on the Bashir regime through diplomatic pressure, threats and forcing difficult concessions such as on Abyei and the infrastructure for oil transportation. South Sudan, although a young poor state, is on the side of the strong who can help it get as much as possible from a reluctant Bashir. To think otherwise will be wishful thinking and unrealistic. A newly created state such as South Sudan needs to be protected by its sponsors (UN, great powers).
The African Union as a continental organisation should distance itself from the Bashir regime and contribute in the pressure that is being exerted on it. To play Pontius Pilate or resort to King Solomon type philosophy (where the child must be divided, but for the determined real mother) will be counter-productive in the circumstance. The AU must insist on the right of South Sudanese to enjoy their newly found independence.
