'M 23 Had Little, Isolated Following'

Prof. Yenshu Emmanuel, Political Science lecturer, University of Buea, Cameroon, explains the recent DRC army defeat of M 23 rebels.

What explains the recent string of victories by the Democratic Republic of Congo Armed Forces over M 23 rebels?

The M 23 is a rather small group that is residual in character as opposed to other groups of a regional character in the East of the DRC. The others have dwindled or phased out, leaving the M 23 with little isolated following. That may be the first reason from a strategic stand point. Secondly, the return to normal democratic political life in DRC has weakened the movement in terms of legitimacy.

As such, their lingering resort to military force might not have been well understood by the people. This undermined their capacity to recruit new soldiers. This was compounded by the atrocities repeatedly committed by rebel groups on civilians over the past. Thirdly, the central government is enjoying some stability after years of turbulent wrangling and internal warfare. Such a context is favourable for the organisation of a State in terms of territorial control and the army. This victory is part of that control.

One should normally expect a better organised and equipped army with a certain level of legitimacy after most of the country has enjoyed some level of peace for some time. The last factor advanced is the weakening of DRC's eastern neighbour, Rwanda, which is facing its own internal problems. This country is known to have sponsored many of the rebel movements in the East of Congo. This has also cut the level of external support to the rebels.

How sustainable are these victories, and can M 23 now be described as a finished military force?

The victories can be enduring if the central government follows up with an effective occupation and ensures a return to normal civilian life in areas once occupied by the rebels. This should be accompanied by security measures that will assure the local people. Moreover, the victories can only be sustainable if there is parallel political reconciliation between former warring parties by addressing the disputes that led to the rebellion in the first place.

It is not enough to win the war; it is equally important to arrive at consensus as a condition for enduring peace. War should not substitute politics even if it is said that war is politics by other means. This is the basis of the twin conditions of coercion and consensus. To this, must be added the need for justice. Persons responsible for war atrocities or crimes should be identified and brought to justice, be it in Congo itself or at the ICC. This is an essential condition for an end to the war without giving the impression of impunity.

Whether the M 23 is a spent force or not does not matter. The whole country is by far larger than M 23. This group should realise that warfare is the wrong road to politics and that political differences cannot be settled by arms. Lastly, solutions should be sought to the criminal link between minerals, armed groups and warfare in the region. The DRC should be able to take effective and absolute control of mining activities in its eastern region.

What chances are there now for peace and stability in eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region?

This is the beginning of peace and stability, depending on a number of conditions. The first of these is the capacity of the DRC in ensuring security within its eastern borders. The second condition is the search for solution to political problems that have given rise to the conflicts that cut across State boundaries.

The most crucial of these problems is the one arising from identities, especially the former Hutu-Tutsi conflict proper to Rwanda and Burundi, but which spilled over into DRC (as a fall back zone for Hutu and Tutsis after the 1994 genocide) and has fuelled the recurrent problems in the latter country.

This problem cannot be solved by one country in the way President Paul Kagame did by imposing consensus internally and combatting Hutu rebels in the DRC as well as destabilising the government of Kinshasa through proxy groups. Both Kigali and Kinshasa should look for common grounds to solve this problem.

Burundi, Uganda, the AU and other international actors should be called into play. Why not envisage regional cooperation structures around the Great Lakes nations that will take care of security issues and political questions? The chances of peace and stability are there, but they need to be exploited.